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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the potential contribution of social justice and social 
policy for an equitable recovery from the crisis in the case of Greece. The 
first part discusses some theoretical dimensions of social justice focusing 
on its interrelation with social policy. Social justice is a contested 
theoretical concept in social and political theory, and a powerful but 
elusive term in social policy. The second part identifies the stark 
injustices in the Greek social policy arena, as well as the discontinuities 
of this ‘paradigm’ with the theoretical discourse provided in the first 
part. It is shown that the key elements of social justice do not inform 
social policy reform in times of crisis, and that the embedded political 
and economic deficit reinforces the uneven impact on the Greek society. 
The latter are predetermined by a sociopolitical culture based on 
clientelism, individualism and favouritism, and prescribed in the anti-
social international ‘rescue plan’. The paper argues for a crisis social 
policy inspired by social justice and proposes a ‘distributive escape’ from 
the Greek deadlock, which entails a new sustainable social policy system, 
incorporating citizenship rights with basic welfare provisions; 
redistribution of resources and nurturing communitarian values. 
 
Keywords: Crisis Social policy, social justice, Greece, redistribution, social 
change. 
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Crisis Social Policy and Social Justice:  
the case for Greece 
 
1. Introduction 
The task of this paper lies not in finding the holy grail of the ultimate 
definition of social justice, or in providing a full interpretation for the 
underdevelopment of a national social policy system. Its purpose is more 
down to earth. First, the aim is to touch on some of the stark imbalances 
between social policy and social justice in theory, and to relate those 
with the case of Greece. Second, it highlights the social consequences of 
the social policy retrenchment shock enforced during the period 2010-
12. Finally, it aspires to offer some insights on the main challenges in 
constructing a ‘crisis social policy paradigm’ -inspired by a commitment 
to social justice- both in theory and in Greece.  
Currently, Greece experiences a violent transformation, which minimizes 
social protection and maximizes inequality within a residual welfare 
system that promotes the interests of the more privileged. This paper 
argues for an egalitarian social policy reforming the prevailing 
individualistic culture, patterns and behaviour. The means for changing 
the politics of social policy and enhancing the dynamics of social justice 
include two dimensions. First, invigorating legitimacy and efficacy in 
resource allocation. Second, redistributing both tangible and intangible 
resources. The argument is that social policy is not only about economic 
resources and welfare benefits. It is also about values, choices and 
patterns. The embedded value deficit in socio-political relations 
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reinforces distortion in the political economy. By contrast, we consider a 
sustainable and redistributive basic social policy; embracing a culture of 
solidarity and granting citizenship rights. This should generate and 
empower an essential social capital, which is vital to escape from the 
current or future political or economic deadlocks. We argue that this is 
the only opportunity available today. 
In theory, social policy is expected to make societies more just and less 
unequal. Social policy embodies an ethos of collectivism and a 
commitment to justice that in practice depends on the way such 
concepts are accommodated. Justice is by definition social. Social 
policies seek to modify welfare on the basis of justice and need, to an 
extent that preserves the support of those paying for it. In Greek 
practice, social policy has failed to tackle inequalities, because it never 
aimed at justice or at challenging the outcomes delivered by the market. 
This is reflected in a highly fragmented social security system applying 
criteria that guarantee more welfare to those less in need. This concept 
of social justice represents an individualistic ideal and not a 
collective/communitarian aim. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The first part discusses some key 
dimensions of social justice focusing on its interrelation with social 
policy. Social justice is a contested theoretical concept in political/social 
theory and a powerful but elusive term in social policy. The second part 
identifies the crude imbalances of social justice in the Greek social policy 
paradigm. This ‘unfair deficit’ reproduces a wide range of inequalities 
today, predetermined by a political system and a social culture which 
never espoused a commitment to justice. The interlock of social policy 
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with social justice, becomes a deadlock in the Greek ‘paradigm’. The 
paper concludes with an argument for a ‘crisis social policy’ paradigm, 
which should redistribute economic and non-economic resources and 
reshape behavioural characteristics.  
2.  Social Policy and Social Justice 
2.1 The notion of social justice 
Social justice is based on equality of rights for all human beings, and 
their possibility to benefit from economic and social progress without 
discrimination (ILO, 2011). But, where does the balance lie between 
equality and inequality, between individual and collective ends? The 
sensible answer is that it should lie at a fair point. However, how are we 
to decide what is fair? This question is appropriate to all policy areas, but 
is of particular importance to social policy. 
The notion of justice can be theorised in many ways, but a useful starting 
point is with Aristotle (e.g. Bostock 2000, Kraut 2002). Aristotle divided 
the idea of justice into two main parts; corrective justice and distributive 
justice. Distributive justice refers to the division of shares in social 
benefits/burdens, and is thus concerned with tax/spend policy. 
Corrective justice is concerned with the rectification of injustice and thus 
entails specific social policy interventions. Following Aristotle, the 
understanding of social justice appears to be endlessly explored and 
contested. Even if all agree that ‘justice’ is a rather good thing, some 
might think that justice refers to equal individual treatment, while 
others understand justice in terms of granting basic human rights. Even a 
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minimal consent presupposes a kind of consensus for the meaning of 
ideas like ‘equality’ or terms like ‘rights’. What is exposed here is the 
‘concept/conception distinction’. The ‘concept’ of justice is the general 
idea, but different political theorists and philosophers have different 
‘conceptions’ of justice. 
According to the philosopher Gallie (1956), certain moral concepts are 
“essentially contested”. For example, ‘good’, ‘right’ and ‘just’ are moral 
concepts, which seem to have a common or shared meaning. Everybody 
agrees that it seems good to alleviate absolute poverty, but the criteria 
for the application of the term ‘good’ differs. Not everybody believes 
that the criteria for ‘good’ should make reference to the conception of a 
flourishing human life and/or of a prospering social welfare. Along these 
same lines, some philosophers do not refer to the same but to only 
synonymous concepts. The meaning of the concept ‘good’ becomes 
contested since each individual has a different understanding of that 
concept. In other words, some concepts are ‘essentially contested’ 
because their nature prevents agreement on the criteria for their 
application. Is this the case for social justice? Although an ‘essentially 
contested concept’, social justice can be -even for Gallie (1956)- directly 
identified by two descriptions. In the first, justice consists of the 
institution and application of those social arrangements, whereby the 
meritorious individual receives his commutative due. In the second, 
justice rests upon the ideas, or ideals, of co-operation, to provide the 
necessities of a worthwhile human life, and of a distribution of products 
to assure such a life to all who co-operate. 
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In the well-known Rawls' “Theory of Justice” (1972), the distinction lies 
between the concept of justice and particular conceptions of justice. For 
him, ‘justice as fairness’ is the most appropriate conception of justice, 
and an agreement on the criteria for a just society is feasible. In other 
words, for Rawls the concept/conception distinction does not imply that 
the concept of justice is essentially contested and also, that not all 
contested concepts are ‘essentially’ contested concepts. The 
concept/conception distinction is found also in Dworkin's theory (1988). 
For him, ‘equality’ is not an ‘essentially contested concept’ because the 
identification and application of stable criteria for its meaning is feasible. 
Equality is rather an ‘interpretive’ concept; i.e. a concept that is subject 
to interpretation. 
Famously, Hayek (1960) disputed the validity of the very idea of social 
justice. The principle of social justice is just an ‘anathema’ (Hayek 1976). 
He agreed for a strong state that promotes not justice but the market 
and ruled out redistribution of wealth. For Nozick (1974), massive 
inequalities according to the distribution of the free market are perfectly 
just. He opposed to the welfare state and to any notion of social justice. 
In his theory, Rawls (1972) incorporates a strong element of social 
justice by redistribution of income, wealth and power. Social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the 
advantage of the worst off. Rawls argues that people in the ‘original 
position’ will opt for safeness through equality, instead of taking the risk 
of inequality. In a word, Rawls might be thought of as a supporter of 
state welfare capitalism (Fitzpatrick 2001). 
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However, the meaning of social justice remains ambivalent and 
controversial. In near egalitarian terms, justice is conceptualised as 
utility, as entitlement and as contract (e.g. Drake 2001). It is widely 
thought that social justice is a notoriously difficult concept to define (e.g. 
Blakemore & Drake 1996). This might be true, for those interested in the 
philosophical or the ethical dimensions of justice. This is less true, for 
those inspired by its aim or convinced for its vital role for well-being 
irrespective of any kind of ideology other than humanism. For them, 
social justice is simply a desirable situation, which balances inequality 
and welfare, and is enforced by redistributive policies embracing 
egalitarian implications. This presupposes a state intervening to 
reallocate wealth and market outcomes. 
After all, a straightforward definition of social justice prescribes how the 
good and bad things in life should be distributed among the members of 
a human society (Miller 1999). In our days, this focuses on the 
redistribution paradigm of social justice which is broadened to embrace 
also non material dimensions, ‘stretching’ beyond traditional concerns 
with the distribution of income and wealth (Lister 2007). This broader 
understanding of social and power relations argues earnestly that the 
problem of domination and oppression should be the basis for a 
conception of social justice (Young 1990). Non-material aspects of social 
justice go beyond the economic distributional; identifying the need for 
justice rooted in the struggle for recognition (Fraser 1997). Recognition 
claims are about how people are represented (e.g. in the media and in 
the political debate); about the extent to which people’s view count; 
about decency and dignity –the enormous importance for people of a 
sense of themselves and their place in the world (Lister 2007). The 
  7 
recognition paradigm reflects cultural and/or symbolic injustices-
misrecognitions in everyday life interactions (Fraser 1997). The 
relationship between cultural recognition and economic redistribution –
which is crucial for the nature of redistributive social policies– is one of 
complementary, rather than competing versions of social justice (Fraser 
& Honneth 2003; Thomson 2006). Within this relationship, the 
dimension of representation is enhancing the recognition paradigm in 
the reframing of contemporary justice analysis (Fraser 2005). 
In sum, redistribution and recognition –including representation and the 
reciprocal nature of respect- reflect the fundamental elements, which 
should drive justice through postmodern rights and plural policies. Social 
justice incorporates recognition and redistribution so as to address the 
economic, political and cultural dimensions of injustice. This translates 
into policy demands for respectful treatment, for social security and for 
granting dignity (Lister 2008). Application of the recognition paradigm of 
social justice illuminates the ways in which poverty politics is also a 
‘politics of recognition and respect’ (Lister 2004). Arguably it is a 
sophisticated form of redistributive justice, which entails representation 
and recognition. It is a more in-depth redistribution of tangible resources 
towards less inequality, incorporating enhancement of intangible rights 
towards more citizenship. 
2.2 Social policy and social justice: a strategy for equality? 
Social justice is a powerful but elusive term for social policy analysis, and 
is concerned with the extent to which social arrangements may be 
regarded as fair (e.g. Alcock et al. 2002, Lister 2007) –i.e. who should get 
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what, and under what terms- and implies a distributional element. Social 
policies produce vertical and/or horizontal redistribution (Culyer 1980). 
The extent to which such redistribution is justified and which form 
should be given priority, depends on the way of understanding the 
principle of equality. It particularly reflects the potential belief that 
certain specific scarce commodities –such as healthcare or education- 
should be distributed less unequally than the ability to pay for them. 
Social justice legitimizes a principle of ‘redistributive equality’ (e.g. Tobin 
1970) –a fair reallocation of income and wealth. This principle leads to a 
range of equalising policies, which modify initial distribution by the 
provision of welfare benefits. In every respect, a socially just distribution 
is primarily concerned with the provision of adequate material resources 
to live with dignity, to overcome disadvantage and to flourish. The 
principle of equality lies at the root of conflict in politics (Brittan 1968). 
Different meanings of equality reflect equally different understandings 
of social policy (e.g. Weale 1993). The ‘thick’ version of equality has been 
variously called ‘social equality’, ‘equality of status’ or ‘equality of 
regard’ (Alcock et al 2002: 77). It reflects the recognition of the 
fundamental equality of each individual in social relationships, and an 
opposition to social privilege or inequality (e.g. Tawney 1931). 
For many of those who laid the foundations of the welfare state –who 
desired an alternative to laissez-faire capitalism and fought for welfare 
reform- social equality was regarded as fundamentally important 
(Fitzpatrick 2001, Offe 1984). In different eras, this was called ‘the 
strategy of equality’ (Tawney 1931, Le Grand 1982). This required the 
establishment of social institutions to grant equal access to those goods 
without which life is impoverished and incomplete (Tawney 1931) –
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namely social policy. After the era of the classic welfare state, egalitarian 
social policy was problematised in a practical sense and criticised for its 
policy result (Le Grand 1982). What we can see is that the relationship 
between equality (outcome) and social policy takes breath when hunting 
for social justice (process) through distributive policy goals. 
Nowadays, there is an overwhelming social policy concern for equality of 
opportunity (e.g. Blakemore & Drake 1996). This paradigm however, 
eschews the need for a redistribution to combat persisting social 
inequalities, and leaves little room to move towards the objective of 
social justice. The equality of opportunities paradigm may be also 
characterized as an ideological compromise between the Left and the 
Right. As a policy purpose equality of opportunity embraces adjustments 
towards equality of liberty and fairness in the distribution of inequalities 
(Fitzpatrick 2001). However, providing open and fair opportunities or 
removing direct discrimination today, overlooks the lifelong injustices of 
yesterday, which prevent substantial equal chances. A fair and identical 
test for a position is a procedure of relative importance for candidates 
with unequal lifelong opportunities in health, education or environment 
(e.g. Frankel 1983, Blakemore & Drake 1996) –not to mention 
distinctions in physical environment (Tawney 1931). This describes a fair 
process with an unequal outcome. This so-called ‘fair process’ tends to 
reproduce disadvantage, and call it meritocracy. This means that the 
complex current nature of the distributive problem –inequality in 
distribution, recognition, and representation- has both a static and a 
dynamic feature. The strategy for equal opportunity may very well fail to 
adequately face up to the latter. Unequal societies may successfully 
manage their social problems, but they do not solve them (Donnison 
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2006-07). Equal opportunity is only part of a competent strategy for 
equality and has also to embrace more intrinsic forms of injustice. 
Concluding, it was the aim of ‘socialist social policies’ to achieve greater 
social equality (Abel-Smith 1984). Eventually, social policies are mainly 
concerned with fair equality of opportunity and their effects on 
distributive social justice appear poor. The non-material aspects of the 
distributive problem -including recognition and representation- go 
beyond the equality of opportunity paradigm. The study of social policy 
strategies reflects that the component of equality gradually becomes an 
even less fundamental principle of social policy aims (Venieris 2011a). 
But as Piachaud (2008) has argued, the justice, or injustice, of the 
distribution of power and resources within communities and nations and 
across the world will shape the lives of future generations. 
2.3 The case for a ‘crisis social policy’ 
The ideas of postmodernism move the discipline of social policy in new 
directions (e.g. Hillyard & Watson 1996). Global distributive justice, 
environmental justice, inter-generational justice and the issue of 
equality of opportunity, are the distributive issues that gather increasing 
attention. Insights from postmodernist theory penetrate thoughts on 
social justice that it is wise to value, especially during crisis. 
According to Beck (1992), ‘second’ modernity is a ‘risk society’. Giddens 
(1994, 1999), has argued that in a globalised and rapidly changing world, 
communities are open, self reflexive and ‘social-democratic’; not closed, 
dogmatic and authoritarian. The industrial ‘safety systems’ of social 
insurance and universal provision became sources of risk and insecurity. 
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Insurance protection is aimed at predictable and collective events, and 
not at the individualized contingencies of a risk society (Taylor-Gooby 
2000). Briefly put, the aim of social policy for redistribution is replaced 
by the concern for, and the prevention and management of risk. This 
means that new ways of securing risk-taking on a collective basis, and of 
avoiding risk-taking on an individualized basis have to be developed. 
However, it is the economic liberalism of the radical Right that has 
generated the risk society in order to consolidate its own ideological 
hegemony by defeating the concepts and values of the classic welfare 
era (e.g. Culpitt 1999). Individualism -in the form of choice, preference, 
and consumption- has replaced collectivism -in the form of altruism, 
needs, and public sphere. The emphasis in policy-making is on 
minimising risks rather than on maximisisng social justice. This largely 
supposes that individual welfare depends on success in the free market 
and those failing –mostly the needy and vulnerable- are excluded and 
victimized by right-wing economics. In other words, risk theory means 
turning the debate back on the radical Right discourse that neither Beck 
nor Giddens deal with adequately (Fitzpatrick 2001).  
An influential sociological argument remains that contemporary society 
consists of social movements rather than classes and/or that a class is 
one form of social movement (Eder 1993, Tarrow 1994). Social 
movements influence welfare systems by offering new perspectives and 
by considering new areas of social interaction that enrich and up-date 
citizenship rights (Kymlicka 1995b). Social movements are related to 
egalitarian policies and ‘differential justice’ that embrace complex forms 
of social provision related to gender, ethnicity, dis/ability, age or 
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sexuality. Therefore, social policy is now increasingly concerned with a 
form social redistribution of non-economic resources such as power, 
access or opportunities towards non-economic rights such as dignity, 
diversity, respect, plurality or autonomy. This also includes the 
reallocation of cultural standing from dominant to non-dominant status 
groups (Fraser 1997) and the protection of the ‘collective rights’ of 
minority groups (Kymlicka 1995a). 
A respective school of thought emerged in the 1980s adopting 
‘communitarian’ ideas (Taylor 1989, Dagger 1997). This reopened the 
classic debate concerning the relationship between the individual and 
the community (Macintyre 1981, 1987; Sandel 1982, 1996). Α debate 
where the core idea of communitarians is that the ‘individual’ cannot be 
separated, from the culture, values and practices of his/her community 
(Sandel 1982). An ideo-typical communitarian welfare state is expected 
to embody strengthened social systems promoting the ‘common good’ 
and communal duties. Social control is a legitimate way for cultivating a 
common good culture. Communitarians call for ‘a politics of the 
common good’ which involves a public ranking of the value of different 
ways of life; there is no way to argue for freedom over equality or 
equality over freedom, both are foundational values (Kymlicka 1990). 
Further, communitarians argue earnestly that the variety of policy 
responses must recognize and respect the heterogeneity of social groups 
(George and Wilding 1985, Young 1990). In a broad sense, the rights and 
duties of citizenship depend on the achievement of a balance between 
individual liberty and social responsibility (Drake 2001). 
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This debate is of particular relevance to European societies today. 
Understanding the challenges for contemporary social policy 
presupposes a deep appreciation of the implications of the ongoing 
worldwide economic crisis, and the role that collective institutions are 
called to undertake as a response. Indeed, the economic crisis is also a 
crisis of the paradigm of right-wing economic liberalism. Instead of 
creating the so-called ‘risk society’ (e.g. Beck 1992), this paradigm has 
generated an insecure, or even desperate, society which to some extent 
rediscovers the concepts and values of the classic welfare era. The social 
implications of the crisis force social policy-making to consider new 
forms of collectivism and the focus should turn again on minimising 
injustices rather than risks. Indeed, one of the effects of contemporary 
crisis is that individual welfare increasingly depends more on collective 
public institutions such as health or education systems, which now suffer 
a decrease in resources due to the combined effects of austerity 
measures and recession. 
Against this background, the need for a new type of ‘crisis social policy’ 
is now evident. What form this new type of policy might take, and, 
further, what are the prospects of promoting justice through social 
intervention during recession? As Prasad and Gerecke (2010) have 
argued, crises can allow countries to reduce ineffective policies in favour 
of equitable ones that will promote growth and improve their policy 
processes and institutional frameworks. In this context, crisis social 
policies should primarily guarantee material basic needs through 
reinforced redistributive mechanisms, focusing on decent basic income 
and effective health services. This may deter the re-emergence of 
inequality levels reminiscent of the early industrial period. In addition, 
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they have to consider non-material needs and to develop new forms of 
intangible provision by taking into account the complexity of 
postmodern societies, and by up-dating citizenship rights and 
community duties. 
Indeed, crisis social policymaking should re-address at least two key 
issues. First, social needs such as recognition and power within civil 
society can be addressed by promoting relative forms of intangible 
resources, and processes towards a communitarian type of 
empowerment. The latter is a process through which people, and 
especially ‘disempowered’ groups, gain power and authority over their 
own affairs (e.g. Alcock et al. 2002). Second, social ills such as poverty 
and unemployment can be addressed by redistributing increasingly fairly 
scarce economic resources, and by enhancing basic universal social 
services based on a new mixed-economy of welfare beyond the market 
and the state (Baines et al. 2011, Hogg & Baines 2011). This new mixed 
economy of welfare is about the enrolment of the voluntary/community 
sector to achieve improved social services and about community 
empowerment, with profound implications for individuals and social 
institutions. It is the part of the economy beyond the public and the 
private sectors variously called ‘social economy’, ‘third sector’, voluntary 
and community sector’ or even ‘civil society’ (e.g. Evers & Laville 2004). 
Its expanding responsibilities for welfare services reflect a tension arising 
in most developed economies in Europe (Hogg & Baines 2011). This 
tension is expected to grow during the current crisis since it is associated 
with spending cuts and reduced public services. Moreover, this tension is 
also an opportunity as it might inspire a communitarian spirit (e.g. 
Williams 2005), a culture of volunteering (e.g. Williams 2008) and, also, 
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faith-based voluntary action (Montagne-Vilette et al. 2011). The 
institutions of civil society and community should be strengthened, not 
least because this reinvigoration may also support the foundation for a 
powerful, communitarian social democracy (Sage 2012). 
These are not simply normative debates, but they also reflect shifts in 
policy and practices. In the UK, in particular, it is evident that the 
relevant debate on welfare mix has shifted. The important role, and 
potential, of the community sector in delivering public services is 
increasingly acknowledged in both the political agenda and relevant 
theoretical debates (e.g. Alcock 2010). Indeed, there are clear signs that 
a re-articulation of the role of community is taking place in the revival of 
social policy in the context of the economic crisis and of the austerity 
policies adopted, placing community at the heart of current welfare 
provision debates (Hanckock et al 2012). In the era of economic turmoil, 
a crisis social policy, engaged with these normative debates and new 
policy practices, but also firmly anchored on a re-articulated notion of 
social justice, can rise to meet the challenges for social intervention. A 
crisis social policy paradigm has to amalgamate ambivalent theory with 
arduous practice. Traditional class theory, contemporary social 
movement analysis and postmodern readings should be combined with 
participatory/communitarian activation and in the context of a shrinking 
economic capacity. This should be added to the weathering postmodern 
‘equilibria’ such as the dominance of capital over labour, the 
disaggregation between economic growth and social development –
namely jobless growth- and the retreat of the nation state. These 
conditions argue for a crisis social policy model that reconciles 
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complicated social needs with discouraging economic trends, and higher 
levels of ‘differential social justice’ with a new social spending agenda.  
This inclusive form of distributive justice reformulates the principle of 
justice at an even deeper level, giving more emphasis on its qualitative 
aspects, which equally require new forms of egalitarian politics and 
participatory procedures. This implies that social policies develop more 
socially effective but also economically sustainable practices that 
nurture social practices that fight all kind of discrimination and ruthless 
individualisation. In turn, this urges for the provision of basic needs as 
well as the empowerment and strengthening of citizenship rights: 
universal, non-discriminatory, inalienable, enforceable rights. This 
conceptual basis can and should inspire a communitarian welfare reform 
towards a more just society, and a more active civil society, enhancing 
socio-democratic rights/duties while refreshing and re-emphasizing 
communal bonds. In a nutshell, crisis social policy presupposes two 
modes of policy change. First, change related to immediate 
redistributive social policies complemented by sustainable universal 
basic social services; and, second, a long-term programme or reforms to 
establish social institutions promoting a deeper understanding of social 
justice and the common good. After all, the pursuit of social justice has 
been the driving force behind much, perhaps most, social change in 
modern times (Piachaud 2008). 
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3. Social Policy and Social Justice in Greece 
3.1 The pattern 
Social policy comprises a system of political interventions in the 
functioning of a market economy with a vital impact on social welfare 
and on economic growth. In Greece, the social policy system reflects a 
legacy of weak political and solidarity patterns and an absence of social 
and financial planning (Venieris 1994). Its main characteristics are: the 
predominance of contributory social transfers –mainly pensions; the 
dominance of unjustified social insurance privileges; the delayed 
evolution of universal welfare policies –mainly in health; the 
underdevelopment of social assistance and social care services; poor 
unemployment protection; distributional imbalance and administrative 
inefficiency; inexistent family policy -in a pattern where family remains 
the essential welfare provider (Venieris and Papatheodorou 2003, 
Petmesidou and Mossialos 2006). The social security mosaic grants high 
benefits to favoured groups of public servants; generous insurance 
benefits to powerful occupational groups rarely justified by contribution 
record; poor insurance provision to average working people; meagre 
social assistance benefits to those in great need. Inequality is the 
predominant feature in all aspects of welfare -the level, the range, the 
criteria, the financing of provision. Inefficiency is the next one - deficient 
administrative capacity, wasteful use of resources. Although social 
spending rose from 19.9 to 26 per cent for the period 1995-2008, and is 
near the EU-15 average of 27.5 per cent, the risk for poverty after social 
benefits remains one of the highest in the EU, at a rate from 20 to 21 per 
cent (Dafermos and Papatheodorou 2011). In short, this is an ineffective 
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system reinforcing inequality, urging for a radical change towards 
redistributive justice and egalitarian ends. 
Pressures for institutional reform and policy reorientation have been 
unsuccessfully exercised since the early 1990s. A late financial 
restructuring of the social insurance system was postponed due to 
strenuous trade unions’ reaction and great upheaval (Venieris 1994). 
Some retrenchment policies were introduced under the vast burden of 
social insurance deficits in the absence of political will and public 
support. The long-sought healthcare reform was never steadily 
supported by any government, which reflects the endless conflict 
between the forces of change and the dominant interest groups (Abel-
Smith et al. 1994, Venieris 1997). A fruitless reorientation has been 
cultivated by a growing EU enforcement for social security 
harmonisation/sustainability. The rising trend of social expenditure in 
Greece after the mid-1990s was mainly due to the EU financial support 
frameworks (Petmesidou and Mossialos 2006). This was not 
accompanied by structural reforms to improve social services or to 
stabilise the financial aspect of the system. Social policy ‘developments’ 
after the turn of the century reassured the weak support for change and 
the strength of consolidated rigidities. During a period of welfare reform 
in Europe, inertia on policy/political level defused modernizing 
tendencies and preserved the legacy of the past: heavily 
politicised/centralised decision making; impoverished administrative 
infrastructure, lack of redistributing and planning, failure in 
counterbalancing individual cost with collective benefit (Venieris 2006).  
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The European Union’s (EU) pressure intensified following the 
convergence criteria for achieving participation in the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). This produced fiscal limitations to a social policy 
system in need of further development and reduced prospects of filling 
the gaps in social protection. A number of coordinated policies 
instigated by EU funds concerned the labour market, the pension 
system, healthcare, and social inclusion. Committees, observatories and 
consultation procedures including national action plans were 
established. Social care and employment services were also enriched 
including nurseries, centres for children and the elderly, home-help for 
elderly and disabled people. But, all these depended on temporary EU 
resources and personnel providing no guarantees for stable provision.  
In sum, the EU influence failed to achieve Europeanisation and to 
enforce a national social policy performance closer to the standards of 
European Social Model. Nevertheless, most of this model hardly 
encompasses a straightforward strategy for equality. Briefly put, the 
national failure of the ‘Greek Social Model’ aggravates the ‘systemic 
equalizing failure’ that deplores the European Social Model. From a clear 
point of view, the performance criteria for a national social model can be 
based on efficiency -in terms of achieving the highest possible 
employment rates- and on equity -in terms of achieving the lowest 
possible poverty risk (Sapir 2005). The Greek welfare model performs far 
than splendid in both terms.  
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3.2 The crisis 
The global economic crisis -from 2008 onwards- had severe 
consequences for modern welfare states affecting remarkably the most 
vulnerable individuals and systems unprepared for such an eventuality. 
It appears that the crisis is being used to recast rapidly social policy 
systems by means of fundamental institutional changes and drastic cuts 
in social spending, severely diminishing it in some countries. This implies 
that there is a specific ideological and conceptual nature to these 
reforms and the crisis is used to legitimise changes otherwise totally 
unacceptable and unfair. Sinfield (2011) has demonstrated a tendency 
by recent governments of advanced welfare states to adopt a downbeat 
discourse of austerity, appearing eager to use the crisis to evade their 
responsibilities to their publics at a time of crisis. However, in the case of 
the recent collapse of Greek welfare state arrangements, the system was 
a victim of its own unilateral suicidal tradition rather than a symptom of 
this tendency. 
Not surprisingly, Greece entered a deep economic and political crisis by 
the end of the first decade of the 21
st
 century. This came after a period 
of constant, but not structurally sustainable, economic growth, political 
aphasia and social affluence. The socialist government elected in autumn 
2009 was faced with an enormous financial pressure. The public deficit 
was higher than 15 per cent of GDP, while the public debt reached 128 
per cent. Speculative attacks of the markets did not allow the 
government to borrow at reasonable interest rates to redress the 
balance. A major part of this deadlock reflects the social, political and 
economic deficits of the Greek welfare state. For instance, pension 
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spending was significantly above the OECD average; it has increased 
from 4.5 in 2005 to 6.6 per cent of GDP in 2009, and in this percentage is 
expected to exceed 24 per cent by 2060 (OECD 2011). 
In early 2010 the Greek turmoil facilitated an international emergency 
plan monitored by the European Union, the European Central Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund. This violent intervention enforced 
painful retrenchment and deregulation policies (Petmesidou 2011, 
Venieris 2011b). Endless drastic austerity measures were taken by the 
controversial combination of a national administration disoriented by 
the magnitude of the crisis and wavering international decision-making. 
The emergency policies adopted included heavy and socially ‘blind’ 
horizontal cuts in income and spending, matched with significant rises in 
direct and indirect taxation. Social upheaval and political unrest were 
the immediate outcome. Notwithstanding, once the market crisis 
erupted, both the European Union and the European Central Bank failed 
to provide a timely and effective response (Featherstone 2011). 
Moreover, when it came, this late response was characterised by a 
punitive rather than a solidarity approach. 
In social policy terms, the eagerness of international intervention at 
diminishing social spending, labour rights and welfare provisions is 
astonishing. The most immediate impact is on cash benefits. Even 
minimum and minimal pensions were severely cut in all ways - level, 
retirement and replacement rates. The secondary impact in social 
services is also tremendous. In health, where the deficits are one main 
reason for the high public deficit, the severe cost-cut policies threaten 
the viability of public health services. In social assistance, the austerity 
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measures diminish provision. In industrial relations, a strategy of 
deregulation and the shrinking of even minimum earnings was the prize 
for international aid. A more detailed examination of the changes 
imposed follows below. 
In pensions, severe cuts were made by the abolition of an average of at 
least 25 per cent of annual pension income (e.g. Venieris 2011b). The 
significant pension retrenchment reform during 2010/11, aimed 
primarily to contain annual spending for pensions until 2060. It 
established lower pension benefits and higher retirement age (65 years 
of age for men and women); reduced insurance privileges of some 
groups and the number of pension funds; almost abolished early 
retirement; and prolonged minimum contribution periods. Most 
importantly, a new system was announced introducing a kind of 
universal basic pension -360 euros from 2015 onwards. This was subject 
to an increase by a contribution-related proportional pension, providing 
incentives for longer working careers but also creating uncertainties for 
low-paid workers-pensioners. The reform allowed a number of unjust 
exceptions. It left untouched: a number of powerful pension schemes 
such as the liberal professions and specific groups of bank employees; 
the privileges of public utility workers and uniformed workers; and the 
semi-contributory pension scheme for farmers. Much of these 
exemptions however, remain in the list of further intervention. A 
maximum pension income has been introduced and is periodically 
shrinking. The two additional monthly pensions received per annum was 
cut for all apart from very low income pensioners for whom it was 
replaced by a low flat ‘vacation allowance’. Painful but comparatively 
fair taxes and/or reductions depending on pension level and pensioner’s 
  23 
age were imposed on top of the cuts. Notably, State participation in 
funding social insurance is to be revoked, ‘counterbalanced’ by the new 
basic pension, which will be funded through general taxation and is 
subjected to economic growth rates. The policy emphasis is now on 
individual contribution pension equivalence. In supplementary 
contributory pensions the abolition of an average of 30 per cent of 
pension is enforced, depending on the financial situation of each fund 
and on pension level. The puzzle for social insurance budgeting now is to 
cope with the dramatic fall in contributions – product of the 
combination of higher unemployment and lower wages- and a rise in 
benefit demand. In short, on the one hand, pension reform diminishes 
spending, provision and collective redistribution. On the other, it 
reduces privileges and prospects for bankruptcy. 
In the health sector, the system was far from ideal. Reform has been 
traditionally blocked by vested interests of powerful socio-professional 
groups (Abel-Smith et al. 1994) and the prospect for a fully functioning 
Greek National Health System (NHS) remained a dead letter for decades. 
Wasteful use of resources, vast deficits and unethical practices were 
associated with low patients’ satisfaction (e.g. Venieris 1997, 2006) while 
embedded commodification, with huge private and absurd 
pharmaceutical spending, created a picture of a very problematic health 
system. Under the pressure of the EU-IMF, a cost-cut platform became a 
top governmental priority. However, any measures to address the 
serious structural inadequacies of the system are simplistically 
conforming to the quest for lower costs. While demand for public health 
services is mounting during the crisis (Venieris 2011b) merging and 
closures of public hospitals and a 15 per cent spending cut for 2011-12 is 
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underway while higher patients’ participation fees are increasingly 
introduced. In primary care, the fragmented health insurance services 
were after all unified in one National Organisation (EOPPY) towards 
reorganisation and rationalisation, a development that is also innovating 
a new public-private welfare mix in hospital services. In pharmaceutical 
spending, there is a visible effort to reduce the embarrassing waste. But, 
contrary to pensions, public spending in health remains beyond the 
OECD average, and new measures have to be associated with improving 
the quality of services (OECD 2010, 2011). Deficits in funding, medical 
personnel and behavioural patterns keep NHS services at an 
embarrassing low level of response and access to services is hardly 
universal. It is also predicted that in 2013, 20 per cent of NHS hospitals 
will close due to EOPPY’s inability to cover hospital fees and by the end 
of 2012, EOPPY appears financially disabled. In a nutshell, there is a clear 
risk that the financial restoration in the health sector might come at the 
price of the demolition of public healthcare. 
There is little disagreement on the fact that social assistance provision in 
Greece is poor and deplorable. The National Social Cohesion Fund, a 
scheme providing social assistance to low income and vulnerable social 
groups has been abolished in mid-2009 (Petmesidou 2011). A benefit 
targeting vulnerable beneficiaries was introduced but was soon 
interrupted in early 2010 under the EU-IMF pressure. Notably, Greece 
remains one of the very few EU countries where a national programme 
of minimum income guarantee is not available even at a local level. 
Current changes announce the merging of some social assistance 
services as well as stricter means-testing conditions. There is an ongoing 
re-appraisal procedure aiming at the abolition of the perceived high 
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levels of fraud by welfare incapacity beneficiaries, mainly in the rural 
areas. This is the outcome of disgraceful clientelistic/illegitimate 
practices which replace welfare benefits according to need with 
disability benefits according to political favouritism. Overall, cost cutting 
measures aside, the only real systemic change remains the 
announcement of the basic universal pension scheme from 2015 
onwards. Although the level of the basic pension is far form adequate - 
less than two thirds of the Greek poverty line (Venieris 2011b) - this 
reform marks the redefinition of the residual Bismarckian Greek welfare 
system towards a Beveridgean type of minimal provision. But still, it is 
social insurance –which is publicly funded by around 50 per cent- that 
remains the essential social policy instrument in Greece. 
In the field of employment, policy is dominated by an assault to 
adequate remuneration and to long-established rights in terms of 
industrial relations. A policy of rapid and extremely harsh 
deregulation/‘flexibilisation’ combined with deep recession had ruinous 
effects upon the labour market. Real unemployment appears out of 
control, according to Eurostat the unemployment rate was 25,4 per cent 
in August 2012 (Eurostat 2012). The minimum wage was reduced to 560 
euros, supposedly in order to improve competition and productivity 
rates. National collective bargaining agreements have been practically 
abolished and the new labour law favours negotiations at the firm level. 
This was met with fierce trade union opposition and its implementation 
is cumbersome. Moreover, following the IMF hail of recommendations, 
the total decrease in salaries and wages in public and private sectors is 
estimated to around 25 per cent (Venieris 2011b). 
Reorganising/reducing the public sector is under slow way. The poor 
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administrative capacity of tax collection is not a clear priority. The 
equilibrium between protective labour legislation and non-protective 
unemployment provision has been overthrown. Shrinking rights of 
employees are matched with an almost scandalously expanding rights of 
employers. Indeed, in terms of rights, the gap between labour and 
capital in Greece is wider than has ever been in recent times. However, 
the recipe of flexibility without security is unlikely to improve things that 
much, while employers appear determined to resort to non-standard 
work to cope with the crisis (Matsaganis 2011). On top, the size of the 
informal labour market, already unacceptably large, appears now to be 
out of control (INEE-GSEE/ADEDY 2011). 
Greece invested superficially in active labour market policies and 
effective modernisation before the crisis and now pays it back. 
Unemployment exceeded 26 per cent by the end of 2012 and keeps 
going, exacerbating the need for protection. But, unemployment 
benefits are comparatively very low and well below the poverty line, 
eligibility criteria are strictly linked to contribution record, thus excluding 
first entrants and young unemployed or those with poor employment 
records (Papadopoulos 2006). Notably, in early 2012 the benefit has 
been reduced from 460 to 360 euros per month. Also, it appears that the 
new unemployment wave generates an astonishing number of 
households in which no member ‘enjoys’ participation in the labour 
market and all members are at mounting poverty risk. There is little 
doubt that unemployment is now the national nightmare in Greece. 
In terms of social justice, the enforced, ‘socially-blind’, measures have 
‘hacked to pieces’ lower incomes, job opportunities, social and labour 
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rights. Horizontal reforms have made pensions lower and more unequal, 
favouring the survivors in the labour market arena and the privileged 
professional groups. The framework imposed intensifies dependency in 
labour market participation and pressures against full and/or descent 
employment. However, the severe extent of tax and contribution 
evasion remains largely untouched and, still, even under these 
emergency conditions, ‘opting-out’ remained the pattern of securing 
favourable treatment for powerful groups at the expense of less 
powerful ones (Matsaganis 2012). Nevertheless, some corrective just 
policies have been enacted: curtailing extensive fraud in social benefits; 
imposing progressive taxation for higher pensions, favouring lower 
benefits and higher ages. Still, income, employment and redistribution 
are shrinking, exacerbating the vast economic/justice deficit. Income in 
the country fell by more than 25 per cent in 2011 and, following the 
fourth austerity Memorandum of November 2012, will suffer a further 
huge fall in 2013-16. 
A social policy ersatz is implemented in Greece; it restrains the welfare 
state while the impoverished society seeks after a social shelter. Pension 
cuts exacerbate inequality and encourage individual solutions for the 
more advantaged. Health restoration reinforces dangerous limitations to 
the right to health. Social assistance remains inexistent. Deregulation 
squeezes industrial rights. Austerity policies leave aside any kind of 
redistribution or de-commodification concerns. In the interests of social 
justice, rationing scarce resources to cut budget deficits and not to 
improve social protection evidently has to change in Greece (Matsaganis 
2012). People in Greece experience a dramatic fall in living standards, in 
available income, in social security and provision. The agony is that there 
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is a certainty of further wage and pension reductions and loss of socio-
economic rights (Papadopoulos & Roumpakis 2012). It is the 
abolishment of European social rights, which outline the ethos of the 
international ‘rescue plan’ supposedly qualified to deal with the Greek 
fiscal crisis. However, austerity measures are currently producing too 
many deprived and much more insecure social strata while other strata 
become better insulated from contributing to the resources needed to 
serve the ‘common good’. This situation underlines the need for a crisis 
social policy approach that takes into account not only of individual 
needs and of the social benefits that promote social welfare but also 
engages with the sort of community in which we aspire to live; what T H 
Marshall (1950) referred to as the ongoing war between citizenship and 
social class (Sinfield 2011). 
3.3 The social change vision (crisis social policy and social justice) 
For many decades representative institutions in Greece - political parties 
and trade unions - promoted clientelistic/occupational interests and 
party-union dependency; allocated benefits and granted offices using 
criteria far removed from notions of justice or meritocracy; and shared 
different and differing values far from a genuine notion of the ‘common 
good’. Civil society was fragmented, collective values were feeble, and 
individualization flourished. In short, Greek welfare capitalism developed 
according to organized interests irrespective of need and any sense of 
equality, distributing provisions in favour of the more advantaged. 
Still, the extent to which the above social and institutional arrangements 
are regarded as fair or remain acceptable is clearly shrinking during the 
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crisis. The material and social inequalities of the ‘affluent’ last decades 
have now become unjustified, with income reductions provoking 
insecurity to all social classes, poverty to the middle and severe 
deprivation to the lower ones. This was not inevitable: a crisis does not 
necessarily translate into lower family incomes or to greater inequality 
and poverty (Matsaganis 2012). The current social costs are inherently 
linked to the traditional welfare injustices including unequal access, 
provision and opportunity. They are products of social policy 
arrangements that have adopted individualism/clientelism, focusing on 
unevenly publicly financed and unfairly granted, namely contributory, 
benefits. Further, they are products of societal values that traditionally 
tolerated and promoted a welfare system lacking solidarity/justice 
concerns and, of course, ignoring citizenship duties. A system where the 
distribution of power, resources, or opportunities was traditionally far 
from equal, the rights of minorities (especially immigrants) were absent, 
and structures of participation or a culture of empowerment were 
unknown. Based on a contested kind of ‘differential anti-citizenship’ 
granting rights according to dubious criteria, this system is now also 
under a serious crisis. Still, this national ‘social deficit’ can be 
readdressed - a new social contract can be instigated in Greece. 
As noticed in the first theoretical part, distributional equality favours a 
range of social policies that are concerned with a fair reallocation of 
resources and opportunities. A decent minimum equalisation of the 
major aspects of welfare cultivates a commitment to reduce inequality 
and a legitimization of redistributive policies. ‘Postmodern’ social policy 
is to be co-organised by the state and civil society and is to be motivated 
by distributive justice and the fundamental component of equality. It is a 
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policy that has to develop a much more sophisticated analytical 
paradigm and to focus upon the current complexities of social inequality. 
In this framework, the new Greek model should incorporate social 
participation with welfare provisions and cultivate a social culture 
inspired by a commitment for less inequality and more equal 
opportunity. 
Today, given the national race to the bottom, there is an imperative 
need for a social revival, which fundamentally demands a new 
distributive social justice pattern. Limited resources and large problems 
urge for a multidimensional reorganisation of social protection. First, by 
covering at a sustainable level, basic material needs in terms of 
minimum income, health and educational services. Second, by 
equalising/redistributing non-material resources in terms of power, 
access, merit and opportunity. Third, by promoting/safeguarding both 
citizenship rights and communal duties. It is an antipoverty strategy 
balancing poor economic resources with viable sociopolitical legitimacy; 
aiming at an inclusive ‘differential social justice’; building a relationship 
of trust between the individual and the community; encouraging the 
concept of ‘active citizenship’; reinventing the concept of common good 
through empowered social groups and institutions. 
In policy means, the strategy towards communitarian ideas and social 
solidarity should include a two-level change. Immediately, by a fairly 
redistributive social policy system catering for basic needs. In the long 
run, by cultivating collective patterns in families and education –a 
concern for justice and equality encompassing also inter-generational 
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redistribution. Launching a social justice agenda should embrace the 
power of legitimacy in the three essential dimensions:  
 The social, by implementing fair and descent social policy measures.  
 The political, by introducing an empowering institutional 
framework and inclusive/participative procedures promoting 
citizenship rights.  
 The economic, by pursuing effective funding/administrative 
adjustments reconciling social protection with employment 
incentives.  
Against this background, and to achieve higher levels of social justice, 
the necessity to reverse the diminishing conditions for decent 
employment, job opportunities and social protection is essential. 
At another level, as long as a deeper politico-economic unification in 
Europe remains doubtful, the reinvigoration of the project of a 
comprehensive European Social Model remains wishful thinking. This 
leaves no space for optimism for welfare Europeanization in countries 
such as Greece while current EU/IMF intervention is enforcing austerity 
generating enormous public antipathy towards EU. But, crises can be 
used as an occasion to improve social policy and strengthen social 
security (Prasad and Gerecke 2010). This means that at the moment, a 
national social reform can and should take the lead starting from the 
restoration/strengthening in the areas of health and education by 
reinvigorating public hospitals, health centres, schools and universities. 
The redistributive impact of public education and health services in 
Greece is significant and reduces inequality at a considerable extent 
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(Koutsabelas & Tsakloglou 2010) while the need for social protection is 
now much greater than ever before (e.g. Matsaganis 2012). The 
austerity policies against fiscal deficits are diminishing welfare resources 
and outcomes while increasing welfare demand and recession. 
Traditional social policy alone cannot eliminate inequality in Greece. To 
recognise inequality involves the need for structural change, acceptance 
for sacrifices by the majority and acknowledging the limits of 
conventional welfare (Titmuss 1965). The Greek structural/institutional 
reform must inaugurate a degree of quality in socioeconomic relations. 
This includes reasonable control of market mechanisms; 
modernization/rationalization of public administration; a fair taxation 
system eradicating tax-evasion. And further, it calls for the reallocation 
of opportunities by the new welfare mix that should combine at least 
three elements: the distribution of non-economic provisions (such as 
universal basic services in health and education); the redistribution of 
non-economic resources (such as equal access, opportunities, 
recognition and power); the allocation of a minimum income by a 
sustainable universal scheme. 
Unjustified inequality is the major contributor to the imbalances that led 
to the financial and political crisis. Experience reveals that it is very 
difficult to cut social spending without increasing inequality by reducing 
benefits. In this respect, welfare provision has to be focused upon 
redistributive basic adjustments in favour of low-income families. OECD 
data underline also the importance of well-targeted government 
transfers during economic slumps, as well as during the recovery 
(Immervoll & Richardson 2011). Still, although some kinds of 
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redistribution policies through social transfers might be ineffective 
and/or unsustainable targeting on behaviour or non-income 
characteristics can produce cost savings while leaving job-search 
incentives intact (Immervoll and Llena-Nozal 2011). The support of low-
income groups presupposes employment and earnings growth to 
achieve descent remuneration and to contain increasing rates of ‘in-
work’ poverty. Policy action to confront inequalities within the labour 
market, mainly those between standard and non-standard forms of 
employment, is another urgent task. 
In a strongly individualistic Greek society, welfare reform should 
accommodate the equilibrium between meritocracy/equality and 
individualism/collectivism. A kind of a Rawlsian system of fair 
inequalities defining a situation where the opportunities available to 
individuals to benefit from privileges are fair, and surplus inequalities are 
so adjusted that greatest benefit is accumulated to those least 
advantaged. This requires a distributive machinery able to influence 
both social-cultural processes and material-financial outcomes. 
During the 2010-12 upheaval, real social policy considerations had little 
chance for attention in the Greek political agenda. However, given that 
economic and social policies are parts of an integrated and 
interdependent whole, agreement cannot be reached on economic 
policies unless their social implications are taken into account (Atkinson 
2012). To safeguard social cohesion and to prevent from social unrest, 
the rising numbers of poor and unemployed people have to be 
protected. Social service cuts can be particularly harsh when a large 
number of people cannot afford commodified services. Crisis social 
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policy in Europe, seem rather concentrated on individual job losses than 
risks facing households and families (Immervoll and Llena-Nozal 2011). 
Policies for non-working partners are also needed to enhance women’s 
participation in the labour market and chances to escape from poverty in 
the household. 
It goes beyond the ambitions of this paper to provide a social policy 
reform framework in concrete terms. This is the task of a forthcoming 
work, which investigates the relationship of the current legislative 
interventions in Greece with the ideas/considerations of this paper. 
Briefly put, without a radical change in the political economy of welfare, 
the depressing features and the discouraging outcomes of the Greek 
welfare system will remain untouched. Our broad –perhaps rhetorically 
forceful but pragmatically trivial- policy proposals towards egalitarian 
ends embrace directions to 
 reshape the mix of welfare finance increasing the part of general 
taxation and reducing the role of insurance contributions 
 rebalance benefits in cash and in kind in favour of the latter (social 
services/ ‘social wage’) with greater emphasis to old-age and child 
care 
 reset social spending priorities by increasing funds for health (NHS) 
and education and by cost-containing the pension system 
 equalise pensions’ criteria eliminating privileges and improving 
instead minimum pension levels against the increasing old-age 
poverty risk 
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 introduce a comprehensive unemployment protection scheme to 
deal seriously with the prevailing national hazard 
 establish a social safety net including both a sustainable minimum 
income and an equalisation of access in social services 
 introduce means testing for non-contributory targeted benefits for 
vulnerable groups 
 eradicate both ‘welfare corruption’ (‘dead pensioners’, healthy 
disability beneficiaries, etc.) and insurance contributions’ evasion 
 reorganise the labour market and the social dialogue mechanisms 
aiming at re-humanising industrial relations 
This list of sustainable reforms begs the question of a vertical 
redistributive element placing special emphasis to intergenerational 
justice. It has to embrace incentives for citizenship/communal 
participation, for better and more just social provision, for a fair 
allocation of tax burdens. It also has to preserve the family as the major 
welfare –and also communal - institution to prevent child poverty and 
further demographic shrinking. The aim at reconciling the recovery of 
both the Greek families’ and the Greek state’s budgets is complex. The 
average social spending of one quarter of GNP should be reoriented in a 
way producing outcomes comparative to the developed EU countries. 
These reforms have to guarantee a fair allocation of benefits to the older 
ones and of opportunities to the younger ones motivated by equality of 
rights safeguarding participation in socio-economic restoration. 
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4. Conclusion 
We live in a world characterised by commodification and increasingly 
precarious employment, weak politics but strong markets, weak 
distributive concerns but strong individual interests. By the end of the 
20
th
 century, societies relied less upon traditional welfare intervention, 
considering post-war policies as unable to secure postmodern risk-
prevention. In the crisis era of the early 21
st
 century, it is rather the old-
type inequalities associated with the industrial era that now increase 
poverty and injustice. Postmodern conceptualisations distinguished 
three tendencies. First, that insecurity and hazards become increasingly 
universal. Second, that societies become more and more individualised. 
Third, that the new risks increase inequalities and injustices against the 
poor. Crisis conceptualisations underpin today the third one –‘old wine 
in new bottles’. 
Social justice advances equality, embraces liberty and enhances welfare. 
Promoting justice is about more than increasing income and creating 
jobs. It is also about rights, dignity and voice for all as well as an 
economic, social and political empowerment (ILO 2011). This draws 
upon a social policy paradigm embracing a remixing of the economy of 
welfare and an additional reallocation of non-economic resources that 
should pursue communal active citizenship. The crisis of today requires 
redistribution machineries funding universal social provision. The society 
of tomorrow needs reshaping of patterns and institutions. 
In contemporary Greece, individualism, clientelism and privilege are key-
elements in understanding the negative impact of social policy to social 
justice. The 2010-12 international austerity plan brings about severe 
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rapid change. This is a blind and unconscious reform that reinforces 
unjust social implications. It promotes the embedded inequality; it 
diminishes income and social expenditure; it extents insecurity and 
commodification; it curtails inefficient welfare provision and hardly won 
labour rights. Pension and health reorganisation is based to cuts and is 
related to insurance contributions, in the ‘era of unemployment’. The 
storm hits more the less privileged/protected, the young and those in 
precarious employment. Social redistribution is negative and a safety net 
is absent. 
Crisis social policy in Greece is defined by market imperatives and 
EU/IMF directives, which neglect or appear to have little understanding 
of reality. This threatens key aspects of social cohesion and 
reproduction. Reforms fail to restore the endemic welfare 
inefficiencies/imbalances and to provide basic protection for the more 
vulnerable. The need for a coherent welfare policy is now as high as the 
risk of poverty. The enforced social policy ersatz draws upon a creeping 
austerity policy aiming at macroeconomic restoration at the expense of 
‘micro-social’ welfare and of European social rights. The national turmoil 
and the international misfortune reinforce inequality and inequity. Ten 
years after Greece’s inclusion in the Eurozone, the future of the country 
is heart-breaking and the vision for a comprehensive/inclusive Social 
Europe for all European citizens is fading. 
But, at the end of the day, the theorisation of social justice and the 
choices of social policy are about the kind of society in which people 
want to live. This paper considered the case for a crisis social policy, 
which in Greece should be based on a new national pattern of 
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values/choices and not on international intervention. It identified a 
social change incorporating citizenship rights (representation, 
redistribution, recognition) with basic welfare provisions (minimum 
income, health, education) while nurturing a communitarian culture. A 
new culture inspired by a commitment for less social inequality and for 
more distributive justice. This vision should be founded on a new 
political economy of welfare reconciling market individualism with a 
common good civil concept. Is this a too good to be true scenario? 
Perhaps it is. But, if a real social change reshaping values and patterns 
cannot be somehow initiated and defended in Greece, institutional, 
political and economic underdevelopment will force the country back to 
a Balkan misery. In a nutshell, given the current policy trajectory, the 
deep economic upheaval can transform into a far deeper social crisis.
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